I’ve had trouble describing the anguish I’ve experienced. Grief? Shock? Like I’m living through some sort of hallucination? Maybe the best description for what I’m feeling is moral shame: To watch the loss of your nation’s honor is embarrassing and painful.
I Should Have Seen This Coming
When I joined the conservative
movement in the 1980s, there were two types of people: those who cared
earnestly about ideas, and those who wanted only to shock the left. The
reactionary fringe has won.
By David Brooks
Illustrations by Ricardo Tomás
April 7, 2025
Charles
de Gaulle began his
war memoirs with this sentence: “All my life I have had a
certain idea about France.” Well, all my life I have had a certain idea about
America. I have thought of America as a deeply flawed nation that is
nonetheless a force for tremendous good in the world. From Abraham Lincoln to
Franklin D. Roosevelt to Ronald Reagan and beyond, Americans fought for freedom
and human dignity and against tyranny; we promoted democracy, funded the
Marshall Plan, and saved millions of people across Africa from HIV and AIDS. When
we caused harm—Vietnam, Iraq—it was because of our overconfidence and naivete,
not evil intentions.
Until January 20, 2025, I didn’t
realize how much of my very identity was built on this faith in my country’s
goodness—on the idea that we Americans are partners in a grand and heroic
enterprise, that our daily lives are ennobled by service to that cause. Since
January 20, as I have watched America behave vilely—toward our friends in
Canada and Mexico, toward our friends in Europe, toward the heroes in Ukraine and President Volodymyr
Zelensky in the Oval Office—I’ve had trouble describing the
anguish I’ve experienced. Grief? Shock? Like I’m living through some sort of
hallucination? Maybe the best description for what I’m feeling is moral shame:
To watch the loss of your nation’s honor is embarrassing and painful.
George Orwell is a useful guide to
what we’re witnessing. He understood that it is possible for people to seek
power without having any vision of the good. “The Party seeks power entirely
for its own sake,” an apparatchik says in 1984.
“We are not interested in the good of others; we are interested solely in
power. Not wealth or luxury or long life or happiness: only power, pure power.”
How is power demonstrated? By making others suffer. Orwell’s character
continues: “Obedience is not enough. Unless he is suffering, how can you be
sure that he is obeying your will and not his own? Power is in inflicting pain
and humiliation.”
Russell Vought, Donald Trump’s budget
director, sounds like he walked straight out of 1984. “When they
wake up in the morning, we want them to not want to go to work, because
they are increasingly viewed as the villains,” he said of federal workers,
speaking at an event in 2023. “We want to put them in trauma.”
Since coming back to the White House,
Trump has caused suffering among Ukrainians, suffering among immigrants who
have lived here for decades, suffering among some of the best people I know.
Many of my friends in Washington are evangelical Christians who found their
vocation in public service—fighting sex trafficking, serving the world’s poor,
protecting America from foreign threats, doing biomedical research to cure
disease. They are trying to live lives consistent with the gospel of mercy and
love. Trump has devastated their work. He isn’t just declaring war on
“wokeness”; he’s declaring war on Christian service—on any kind of service,
really.
If there is an underlying philosophy
driving Trump, it is this: Morality is for suckers. The strong do what they
want and the weak suffer what they must. This is the logic of bullies
everywhere. And if there is a consistent strategy, it is this: Day after day,
the administration works to create a world where ruthless people can thrive.
That means destroying any institution or arrangement that might check the
strongman’s power. The rule of law, domestic or international, restrains power,
so it must be eviscerated. Inspectors general, judge advocate general officers, oversight mechanisms, and watchdog agencies are
a potential restraint on power, so they must be fired or neutered. The truth
itself is a restraint on power, so it must be abandoned. Lying becomes the
language of the state.
Trump’s first term was a precondition
for his second. His first term gradually eroded norms and acclimatized America
to a new sort of regime. This laid the groundwork for his second term, in which
he’s making the globe a playground for gangsters.
We used to live in a world where
ideologies clashed, but ideologies don’t seem to matter anymore. The strongman
understanding of power is on the march. Power is like money: the more the
better. Trump, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and the rest of the world’s
authoritarians are forming an axis of ruthlessness before our eyes. Trumpism
has become a form of nihilism that is devouring everything in its path.
The
pathetic thing is that I didn’t see this
coming even though I’ve been living around these people my whole adult life. I
joined the conservative movement in the 1980s, when I worked in turn at National
Review, The Washington Times, and The Wall Street
Journal editorial page. There were two kinds of people in our movement
back then, the conservatives and the reactionaries. We conservatives earnestly
read Milton Friedman, James Burnham, Whittaker Chambers, and Edmund Burke. The
reactionaries just wanted to shock the left. We conservatives oriented our
lives around writing for intellectual magazines; the reactionaries were
attracted to TV and radio. We were on the political right but had many liberal
friends; they had contempt for anyone not on the anti-establishment right. They
were not pro-conservative—they were anti-left. I have come to appreciate that
this is an important difference.
I should have understood this much
sooner, because the reactionaries had revealed their true character as far back
as January 1986. A group of progressive students at Dartmouth had erected a
shantytown on campus to protest apartheid. One night, a group of 12 students, most of them associated
with the right-wing Dartmouth Review, descended on the shanties
with sledgehammers and smashed them down.
Even then I was appalled. Apartheid
was evil, and worth opposing. A nighttime raid with sledgehammers seemed more
Gestapo than Burkean. But conservative intellectuals didn’t take this seriously
enough. In large part, I think this was because we looked down on the Dartmouth
Review mafia, whose members had included Laura Ingraham and Dinesh
D’Souza. Their intellectual standards were so obviously third-rate. I don’t
know how to put this politely, but they just seemed creepy—nakedly ambitious in
a way that I thought would destroy them in the end.
From the December 2024 issue: David Brooks on how the Ivy
League broke America
Instead, history has smiled on them. A
prominent publisher of right-wing authors once told me that the way to sell
conservative books is not to write a good book—it’s to write a book that will
offend the left, thereby causing the reactionaries to rally to your side and
buy it. That led to books with titles such as The Big Lie: Exposing the
Nazi Roots of the American Left, and to Ann Coulter’s entire career. Owning
the libs became a lucrative strategy.
Of course, the left made it easy for
them. The left really did purge conservatives from universities and other
cultural power centers. The left really did valorize a “meritocratic” caste
system that privileged the children of the affluent and screwed the working
class. The left really did pontificate to their unenlightened moral inferiors
on everything from gender to the environment. The left really did create a
stifling orthodoxy that stamped out dissent. If you tell half the country that
their voices don’t matter, then the voiceless are going to flip over the table.
It turns out that when you mix
narcissism and nihilism, you create an acid that corrodes every belief system
it touches.
But although Trump may have campaigned
as a MAGA populist, leveraging this working-class resentment to gain power, he
governs as a Palm Beach elitist. Trump and Elon Musk are billionaires who went
to the University of Pennsylvania. J. D. Vance went to Yale Law School. Pete
Hegseth went to Princeton and Harvard. Vivek Ramaswamy went to Yale and
Harvard. Stephen Miller went to Duke. Ted Cruz went to Princeton and Harvard.
Many of Musk’s DOGE workers, according to The New York Times, come from elite institutions—Harvard, Princeton,
Morgan Stanley, McKinsey, Wharton. These are the Vineyard Vines nihilists, the
spiritual descendants of the elite bad boys at the Dartmouth Review.
This political moment isn’t populists versus elitists; it is, as I’ve written
before, like a civil war in a prep school where the sleazy rich kids are taking
on the pretentious rich kids.
Derek Thompson: DOGE’s reign of ineptitude
The MAGA elite rode to power on
working-class votes, but—trust me, I know some of them—they don’t care about
the working class. Trump and his crew could have taken office with actual plans
to make life better for working-class Americans. An administration that cared
about the working class would seek to address its problems, such as the fact
that the poorest Americans die an average of 10 to 15 years
younger than their higher-income counterparts, or that by sixth
grade, many of the children in the poorest school districts have fallen four grade levels behind those in the richest.
An administration that cared about these people would have offered a bipartisan
industrial policy to create working-class jobs.
These faux populists have no interest
in that. Instead of helping workers, they focus on civil war with their
left-wing fellow elites. During Trump’s first months in office, one of their
highest priorities has been to destroy the places where they think liberal
elites work—the scientific community, the foreign-aid community, the Kennedy Center, the Department of Education, universities.
It
turns out that when you mix
narcissism and nihilism, you create an acid that corrodes every belief system
it touches.
This Trumpian cocktail has eaten away at Christianity, a faith oriented
around the marginalized. Blessed are the meek. Blessed are the poor in spirit.
The poor are closer to God than the rich. Again and again, Jesus explicitly
renounced worldly power.
Read: Evangelicals made a bad trade
But if Trumpism has a central tenet,
it is untrammeled lust for worldly power. In Trumpian circles, many people
ostentatiously identify as Christians but don’t talk about Jesus very much;
they have crosses on their chest but Nietzsche in their heart—or, to be more
precise, a high-school sophomore’s version of Nietzsche.
To Nietzsche, all of those Christian
pieties about justice, peace, love, and civility are constraints that the weak
erect to emasculate the strong. In this view, Nietzscheanism is a morality for
winners. It worships the pagan virtues: power, courage, glory, will,
self-assertion. The Nietzschean Übermenschen—which Trump and Musk clearly
believe themselves to be—offer the promise of domination over those sick
sentimentalists who practice compassion.
Two decades ago, Michael Gerson, a
graduate of Wheaton College, a prominent evangelical institution, helped George W. Bush start the U.S. President’s Emergency
Plan for AIDS Relief, which has saved
25 million lives in Africa and elsewhere. I traveled with
Gerson to Namibia, Mozambique, and South Africa, where dying people had
recovered and returned to their families, and were leading active lives. It was
a proud moment to be an American. Vought—Trump’s budget director, who also
graduated from Wheaton—championed the evisceration of PEPFAR, which has
now been set in motion by executive order, effectively sentencing thousands to death.
Project 2025, of which Vought was a principal architect, helped lay the
groundwork for the dismantling of USAID; its gutting appears to
have ended a program to supply malaria protection to 53 million people
and cut emergency food packages for starving
children. Twenty years is a short time in which to have traveled the long moral
distance from Gerson to Vought.
From the April 2018 issue: Michael Gerson on Trump and the
evangelical temptation
Trumpian nihilism has eviscerated
conservatism. The people in this administration are not conservatives. They are
the opposite of conservatives. Conservatives once believed in steady but
incremental reform; Elon Musk believes in rash and instantaneous disruption.
Conservatives once believed that moral norms restrain and civilize us,
habituating us to virtue; Trumpism trashes moral norms in every direction,
riding forward on a tide of adultery, abuse, cruelty, immaturity, grift, and corruption.
Conservatives once believed in constitutional government and the Madisonian
separation of powers; Trump bulldozes checks and balances, declaiming on
social media, “He who saves his Country does not violate any Law.” Reagan
promoted democracy abroad because he thought it the political system most
consistent with human dignity; the Trump administration couldn’t care less
about promoting democracy—or about human dignity.
How
does this end? Will anyone on the right
finally stand up to the Trumpian onslaught? Will our institutions withstand the
nihilist assault? Is America on the verge of ruin?
In February, about a month into
Trump’s second term, I spoke
at a gathering of conservatives in London called the Alliance
for Responsible Citizenship. Some of the speakers were pure populist (Vivek
Ramaswamy, Mike Johnson, and Nigel Farage). But others were center-right or not
neatly ideological (Niall Ferguson, Bishop Robert Barron, and my Atlantic colleague
Arthur C. Brooks).
David Brooks: Confessions of a Republican exile
In some ways, it was like the
conservative conferences I’ve been attending for decades. I listened to a woman
from Senegal talking about trying to make her country’s culture more
entrepreneurial. I met the head of a charter school in the Bronx that focuses
on character formation. But in other ways, this conference was startlingly
different.
In my own talk, I sympathized with the
populist critique of what has gone wrong in Western societies. But I shared
with the audience my dark view of President Trump. Unsurprisingly, a large
segment of the audience booed vigorously. One man screamed that I was a traitor
and stormed out. But many other people cheered. Even in conservative precincts
infected by reactionary MAGA-ism, some people are evidently tired of Trumpian
brutality.
As the conference went on, I noticed a
contest of metaphors. The true conservatives used metaphors of growth or
spiritual recovery. Society is an organism that needs healing, or it is a
social fabric that needs to be rewoven. A poet named Joshua Luke Smith said
we needed to be the seeds of regrowth, to plant the trees for future
generations. His incantation was beatitudinal: “Remember the poor. Remember the
poor.”
But others relied on military
metaphors. We are in the midst of civilizational war. “They”—the wokesters, the
radical Muslims, the left—are destroying our culture. There were allusions to
the final epochal battles in The Lord of the Rings. The implication
was that Sauron is leading his Orc hordes to destroy us. We are the heroic
remnant. We must crush or be crushed.
The warriors tend to think people like
me are soft and naive. I tend to think they are catastrophizing narcissists.
When I look at Trump acolytes, I see a swarm of Neville Chamberlains who think
they’re Winston Churchill.
I understand the seductive power of a
demagogue who tells you that the people who look down on you are evil. I
understand the seductive power of being told that your civilization is on the
verge of total collapse, and that everything around you is degeneracy and ruin.
This message gives you a kind of terrifying thrill: The stakes are apocalyptic.
Your life has meaning and urgency. Everything is broken; let’s burn it all
down.
I understand why people who feel
alienated would want to follow the leader who speaks about domination and
combat, not the one who speaks about healing and cooperation. It doesn’t matter
how many times you’ve read Edmund Burke or the Gospel of Matthew—it’s still
tempting to throw away all of your beliefs to support the leader who promises
to be “your retribution.”
America may well enter a period of
democratic decay and international isolation. It takes decades to develop
strong alliances, and to build the structures and customs of democracy—and only
weeks to decimate them, as we’ve now seen. And yet I find myself confident that
America will survive this crisis. Many nations, including our own, have gone
through worse and bloodier crises and recovered. In Upheaval:
Turning Points for Nations in Crisis, the historian and
scientist Jared Diamond provides case studies—Japan in the late 19th century,
Finland and Germany after World War II, Indonesia after the 1960s, Chile and
Australia during and after the ’70s—of countries that came back stronger after crisis,
collapse, or defeat. To these examples, I’d add Britain in the 1830s and ’40s,
and the 1980s, and South Korea in the 1980s. Some of these countries (such as
Japan) endured war; others (Chile) endured mass torture and “disappearances”;
still others (Britain and Australia) endured social decay and national decline.
All of them eventually healed and came back.
America itself has already been
through numerous periods of rupture and repair. Some people think we’re living
through a period of unprecedented tumult, but the Civil War and the Great
Depression were much worse. So were the late 1960s—assassinations, riots, a
failed war, surging crime rates, a society coming apart. From January 1969
until April 1970, there were 4,330 bombings in the U.S., or about nine a day.
But by the 1980s and ’90s—after getting through Watergate, stagflation, and the
Carter-era “malaise” of the ’70s—we had recovered. As brutal and disruptive as
the tumult of the late 1960s was, it helped the country shake off some of its
persistent racism and sexism, and made possible a freer and more
individualistic ethos.
But the most salient historical
parallel might be the America of the 1830s. Andrew Jackson is the American
president who most resembles Trump—power-hungry, rash, narcissistic, driven by
animosity. He was known by his opponents as “King Andrew” for his expansions of
executive power. “The man we have made our President has made himself our
despot, and the Constitution now lies a heap of ruins at his feet,” Senator Asher Robbins of Rhode Island said.
“When the way to his object lies through the Constitution, the Constitution has
not the strength of a cobweb to restrain him from breaking through it.” Jackson
brazenly defied the Supreme Court on a ruling about Cherokee Nation territory
(a defiance, it should be noted, that Vice President Vance has explicitly endorsed).
“Though we live under the form of a republic,” Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story wrote, “we
are in fact under the absolute rule of a single man.”
But Jackson made the classic mistake
of the populist: He overreached. Fueled by personal hostility toward elites, he
destroyed the Second Bank of the United States, an early precursor to the
Federal Reserve System, and helped spark an economic depression that ruined the
administration of his chosen successor, Martin Van Buren.
In response to Jackson, the Whig Party
arose in the 1830s to create a new political and social order. Devoutly
anti-authoritarian, the Whigs were a cultural, civic, and political force all
at once. They emphasized both traditional morality and progressive
improvements. They agitated for prison reform and for keeping the Sabbath, for
more women’s participation in politics and for a strong military, for
government-funded public schools and for pro-business government policies. They
were opposed to Jackson’s monstrous Indian Removal Act, and to the Democratic
Party’s reactionary, white-supremacist social vision. Whereas Jacksonian
Democrats emphasized negative liberty—get your hands off me—the Whigs,
who would turn into the early Republican Party of Abraham Lincoln, emphasized
positive liberty, empowering Americans to live bigger, better lives with things
such as expanded economic credit, free public education, and stronger legal
protections including due process and property rights.
Though we’ve come to call the
early-to-mid-19th century the Age of Jackson, the
historian Daniel Walker Howe notes that it was not Jackson but
the Whigs who created the America we know today. “As economic modernizers, as
supporters of strong national government, and as humanitarians more receptive
than their rivals to talent regardless of race and gender,” Howe writes, the
Whigs “facilitated the transformation of the United States from a collection of
parochial agricultural communities into a cosmopolitan nation integrated by
commerce, industry, information, and voluntary associations as well as by
political ties.” Looking back, Howe concludes, we can see that even though they
were not the dominant party of their time, the Whigs “were the party of
America’s future.” To begin its recovery from Trumpism, America needs its next
Whig moment.
Yes,
we have reached a point
of traumatic rupture. A demagogue has come to power and is ripping everything
down. But what’s likely to happen is that the demagogue will start making
mistakes, because incompetence is built into the nihilistic project. Nihilists
can only destroy, not build. Authoritarian nihilism is inherently stupid. I
don’t mean that Trumpists have low IQs. I mean they do things that run directly
against their own interests. They are pathologically self-destructive. When you
create an administration in which one man has all the power and everybody else
has to flatter his voracious ego, stupidity results. Authoritarians are also
morally stupid. Humility, prudence, and honesty are not just nice virtues to
have—they are practical tools that produce good outcomes. When you replace them
with greed, lust, hypocrisy, and dishonesty, terrible things happen.
From the September 2023 issue: David Brooks on why
Americans are so awful to one another
The DOGE children are doubtless
brilliant in certain ways, but they know as much about government as I know
about rocketry. They announced an $8 billion cut to an Immigration and Customs
Enforcement contract—though if they had read their own documents correctly,
they would have realized that the cut was less than $8 million.
They eliminated workers from the National Nuclear Security Administration,
apparently without realizing that this agency controls nuclear
security, and had to undo some of those cuts shortly thereafter.
Trump seems to be trying to give a bunch of Sam Bankman-Frieds access to
America’s nuclear arsenal and IRS records. What could go wrong?
When Trump creates an unnecessary
crisis, it’s unlikely to be a small one. The proverbial “adults in the room”
who contained crises in Trump’s first term are gone. Whatever the second-term
crisis—runaway inflation? a global trade war? a cratered economy and plummeting
stock market? an out-of-control conflict in China? botched pandemic management?
a true hijacking of the Constitution precipitated by defiance of the courts?—it
is likely to crater his support and shift historical momentum.
But although Trumpism’s collapse is a
necessary condition for national recovery, it is not a sufficient one. Its
demise must be followed by the hard work necessary to achieve true civic and
political renewal.
Progress is not always a smooth or
merry ride. For a few decades, nations live according to one paradigm. Then it
stops working and gets destroyed. When the time comes to build a new paradigm,
progressives talk about economic redistribution; conservatives talk about
cultural and civic repair. History shows that you need both: Recovery from
national crisis demands comprehensive reinvention at all levels of society. If
you look back across the centuries, you find that this process requires several
interconnected efforts.
First, a national shift in values. In
the late 19th century, for example, as the country went through the wrenching
process of industrialization, America was traumatized by severe recessions and
mass urban poverty. In response, social Darwinism gave way to the social-gospel
movement. Social Darwinism, associated with thinkers such as Herbert Spencer,
valorized survival of the fittest and claimed that the poor are poor because of
inferior abilities. The social-gospel movement, associated with theologians such
as Walter Rauschenbusch, emphasized the systemic causes of poverty, including
the Gilded Age’s concentration of corporate power. By the early 20th century,
most mainline Protestant denominations had signed on to the Social Creed of the Churches,
which called for, among other things, the abolition of child labor and the
creation of disability insurance.
Second, nations that hang together
through crisis have a strong national identity—they return to their roots. They
have a leader who replaces the amoralism of the nihilists, or, say, the
immorality of slavery, with a strong redefinition of the nation’s moral
mission, the way Lincoln redefined America at Gettysburg.
Third, a civic renaissance. After the
social gospel took root, Americans in the 1890s and early 1900s launched and
participated in a series of social movements and civic organizations: United
Way, the NAACP, the Sierra Club, the settlement-house movement, the American
Legion.
Fourth, a national reassessment. As
Jared Diamond notes, nations that turn around don’t catastrophize. Rather, they
develop a clear-eyed view of what’s working and not working, and they pursue
careful, selective change. According to Diamond’s research, the leaders of
successful reform movements also take responsibility for their part in the
crisis. For instance, Germany’s leaders accepted responsibility for the
country’s Nazi past; Finland’s leaders took responsibility for an unrealistic
foreign policy before World War II, when they had to deal with a looming Soviet
Union on their border; and Australia’s leaders took responsibility in the 1970s
for a political culture and foreign policy that had become overly dependent on
Britain.
Fifth, a surge of political reform. In
1830s and ’40s Britain—racked by social chaos, bank failures, a severe
depression, riots, and crushing wealth inequality—Prime Minister Robert Peel, a
leader of great moral rectitude, built the modern police force, reduced
tariffs, pushed railway legislation that literally laid the tracks for British
industrialization, and helped pass the Factory Act of 1844, which regulated
workplaces. In early-20th-century America, Progressives produced a comparable
flurry of effective reforms that pulled the country out of its
industrialization crisis.
In the long term, Trumpism is doomed.
Power without prudence and humility invariably fails. Then comes the hard work
of political renewal.
Part of political reform is an
expansion of the circle of power. What that would require in America today is,
among other things, a broad effort to include working-class and conservative
voices in what have traditionally been cultural bastions of elite progressivism—universities,
the nonprofit sector, the civil service, the mainstream media.
Derek Thompson: Abundance can be America’s next political
order
Finally, economic expansion. Economic
growth can salve many wounds. Pursuing a
so-called abundance agenda—a set of policies aimed at reducing
government regulation and increasing investment in innovation, and expanding
the supply of housing, energy, and health care—is the most promising way to achieve that
expansion.
in
the long term, Trumpism is doomed. Power
without prudence and humility invariably fails. Nations, like people, change
not when times are good but in response to pain. At a moment when Trumpism
seems to be devouring everything, the temptation is to believe that this time
is different.
But history doesn’t stop moving. Even
now, as I travel around the country, I see the forces of repair gathering in
neighborhoods and communities. If you’re part of an organization that builds
trust across class, you’re fighting Trumpism. If you’re a Democrat jettisoning
insular faculty-lounge progressivism in favor of a Whig-like working-class
abundance agenda, you’re fighting Trumpism. If you are standing up for a moral
code of tolerance and pluralism that can hold America together, you’re fighting
Trumpism.
Over time, changes in values lead to
changes in relationships, which lead to changes in civic life, which eventually
lead to changes in policy and then in the general trajectory of the nation. It
starts slow, but as the Book of Job says, the sparks will fly upward.