Iran’s New
‘Nuclear’ Weapon
What happens if the U.S. declines to fight for the Strait
of Hormuz.
Eric
S. Edelman, Reuel Marc Gerecht, & Ray
Takeyh / May 26, 2026
The Islamic Republic
isn’t a problem that can be wished away through quick fixes. Countering Iran,
which is a far less challenging foe than the former Soviet Union and
communist-turned-fascist China, is, nonetheless, a demanding prospect. And
we know what doesn’t work: Arms-control agreements laced with financial
dividends didn’t transform the Islamist regime into a responsible state.
If anything, Barack
Obama’s nuclear deal provided the cash that allowed Tehran to intensify its
malevolent behavior. Washington’s exclusive focus on Iran’s nuclear threat also
told Tehran that its proxy-war strategy against Israel wouldn’t encounter any serious
American opposition. Any new nuclear deal, if one is even possible today,
will likely recertify all the crippling weaknesses of the first accord and
possibly add more.
Donald Trump appears on
the cusp of an agreement to demilitarize, at least temporarily, the Hormuz
Strait. Ancillary to this may be certain Iranian nuclear promises and U.S.
sanctions relief. Whatever the actual details of this accord are, no matter
whether it later, in part or entirely, falls apart, this agreement flows
directly from Tehran dueling Washington to a standstill. Iranian tenacity, not
the acumen of the regime’s diplomats and statesmen or the feebleness of their
American counterparts, has led to this point.
An indisputable
truth: A massive bombing campaign by Israel and the United States has
allowed Tehran to see the incomparable utility of the Strait of Hormuz as a
weapon against the global economy and its primary enemies. Donald Trump may
have finally “TACOed” because he’s unwilling to take the military risks that
would surely accompany any serious effort to open the strait. A reanimated
Islamist regime—and we don’t doubt that senior commanders in the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps now think they are winning—might even refuse a
generous nuclear deal because it’s having so much fun humbling its
foes. In the past, the clerical regime often overplayed its hand. This
war, and the one last June, probably wouldn’t have happened if Tehran had been
less zealous in supporting its proxies, expanding uranium enrichment, and
increasing missile production. It’s possible it will overplay its hand
again.
Yet a victory in the
strait for Iran offers the promise of almost everything: a defeat of the
United States and regime-buttressing shockwaves coming from that failure; the
ever-present prospect of money from tolls on Persian Gulf shipping; restarting
the export of Iranian oil to China and possibly to others for hard currency; a
potential check on overt Israeli attacks on Iran and greater American
hesitancy—possibly even discord between Jerusalem and Washington—about Israeli
actions against Iranian proxies; and Iranian dominion over the future of Arab
Gulf states. The Islamic Republic has been desperate for a win since the
Hamas invasion of Israel on October 7, 2023, unleashed a sequence of events
that shredded so many of the regime’s accomplishments. It looks now like it
could be on the cusp of a big one.
Though we can still
imagine a containment strategy against the clerical regime, if the Islamic
Republic can hold Hormuz hostage, Tehran will severely wound America’s
self-confidence, reputation, and capacity. Even if some arrangement can
be made to allow commercial traffic to pass without paying tolls, which appears
to be part of the current agreement between Tehran and Washington, once most of
the U.S. armada returns home, the odds of the warships returning aren’t
good. The odds of the Islamic Republic demanding tolls later are a near
certainty. Freedom of navigation ends unless Washington can find the military
means and the will necessary to sustain convoys, even under hostile fire. This
frustrating denouement, which would ensure shipping remains far below pre-war
levels, may be enough, however, to avoid $150-plus-per-barrel oil and a global
recession. It could conceivably allow Washington to maintain
regime-crippling pressure on Tehran. Take away the U.S. armada, however, and
Washington will lose most of its leverage.
All nations have their
breaking points. It’s possible that the theocracy may succumb to the
contradictions of its own making. Yet the regime’s resilience has been
impressive. Bound together by ideological conviction, the regime’s elite
remains deeply entrenched and multilayered. Though battered, the regime still
appears to retain the capacity to mobilize its core supporters, make decisions,
and enforce them.
In January, Iranian
security forces killed with brutal efficiency. This uprising was one of
the most consequential and sobering in the history of the Islamic Republic.
This was the first time the clerical oligarchs faced popular protest after
losing a war in June. The sight of Americans and, more humiliatingly, Israelis
blowing up nuclear installations and killing generals in their homes was a bad
look for a regime that rules by force and fear. Both President Trump and Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sensed in the regime’s defeat last June the
prospect of its collapse. This undoubtedly nudged them toward launching another
campaign in February.
But that campaign has
yielded a more unpredictable regime. The new powerbrokers are drawn largely
from the Revolutionary Guards, with the still-hidden Mojtaba Khamenei, the
putative, wounded supreme leader, taking his cues from the enforcers. These men
are not necessarily more militant, but in some ways they are bolder. The
American and Israeli killings precipitated a shift within the regime, elevating
those who had grown weary of what they regarded as Ali Khamenei’s nuclear
timidity in the face of mounting danger.
A series of articles
in Javan, a mouthpiece of the Revolutionary Guards,
introduced a new doctrine dubbed “offensive deterrence.” The series began
by taking a swipe at the martyred supreme leader: “Iran’s previous doctrine was
defined in controlling tensions below the level of war, but the forty-day war
was the starting point for deterrence through expanding the geography of
crisis.” The new crew highlighted the geographical weapon that the regime had
always boasted about in its propaganda but never attempted to use: “The Strait
of Hormuz overlooks the coast of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and it is
natural that, as a coastal country, we have the right to monitor and exercise
sovereignty over our coastal waters. … The world economy’s critical dependence
on this route makes this source of income absolutely unsanctionable and
transforms the structure of Iran’s political economy from crude oil sales to
sustainable transit income.” Ali Nikzad, the deputy speaker of Parliament, went
so far as to declare, “The Strait of Hormuz is Iran’s atomic bomb.”
It is an exaggeration to
claim that nuclear arms have lost their centrality in the regime’s strategic
calculations. The bomb is still important for ensuring Iran’s regional sway.
But the nuclear infrastructure is far too battered to deliver nuclear weapons
soon. By contrast, control over the waterways offers immediate, simpler
power.
President Trump’s
failure to gain control over Hormuz undoubtedly in part flows from the
realization of how much effort would be required to hold the strait after
the battle to clear it. Containing the Islamic Republic will necessitate a
radical review of the prevailing assumptions that have underpinned earlier
national-security strategies—both Republican and Democratic. The Trump
administration’s 2026 National Defense Strategy suggested, “[Department of War]
will empower regional allies and partners to take primary responsibility for
deterring and defending against Iran and its proxies.” The United States has
sought to move away from involvement in “forever wars,” relying on Israel and
Arab Gulf states who were supposedly “increasingly willing and able to do more
… against Iran and its proxies.” More U.S. military assets and defense spending
were supposed to be shifted toward China.
Although U.S. partners
in the region have been increasing their own indigenous defense capabilities,
this war has shown that neither the Saudis nor the Emiratis are comfortable on
offense, despite reports that they launched clandestine strikes of their own
against Iran. Only American involvement can provide key military
capabilities–for example, continuous technically gathered intelligence,
persistent reconnaissance, surveillance, command and control, and the sheer
firepower necessary for degrading the Iranian military. We know already that
nearly 40 days of bombing has not yet provided us with deterrence since the
regime still is capable of shooting at ships and our Gulf allies. That could
change since the Revolutionary Guards might prefer to absorb less damage. In
any case, we do know that the U.S. would need to maintain in theater a lot of
firepower to have any chance of dissuading the Guards from further
violence.
Patrolling the Persian
Gulf to keep the Strait of Hormuz open post-ceasefire would be a mission of
uncertain duration, depending on the regime’s ability to survive the unresolved
crises it faces. At a minimum, it would demand a large, sustained, multi-domain,
layered, multinational defense presence. The U.S. will need to rebuild or
relocate the many bases it has operated in the region in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Iraq, as they appear to have sustained serious
damage. Some of the cost, estimated to be between $15 billion and $25
billion, will presumably be borne by host nations. But not all of
it. Beyond the facilities, the cost of replacing and/or repairing the
40-plus manned and unmanned aircraft that were damaged or destroyed will likely
to fall on the U.S. taxpayer as will the costs of replenishing America’s
depleted munitions stocks—an effort that is already creating ripple effects in
Europe and the Indo-Pacific.
The ongoing requirements
would likely mean that the U.S., which in recent years has had no or just one
carrier strike group near the Middle East, will likely in future require
two. An Amphibious Ready Group or two would also be necessary, as well as
up to six to 10 guided-missile destroyers, two attack submarines, and a
guided-missile submarine. The force would also require several P-8 Poseidon
maritime surveillance and RC-135 Rivet Joint reconnaissance planes and unmanned
MQ-9 Reaper aircraft for continuous surveillance. We would need to maintain
E-2D Hawkeye and E-3 Sentry aircraft for command-and-control purposes, as well
as a variety of rotary-wing aircraft for coastal and search-and-rescue
operations.
Also needed are ground
and sea-based fighter aircraft, several Independence-class littoral combat
ships for demining operations, and unmanned autonomous vehicles and manned
aircraft for persistent surveillance. Augmented land- and sea-based aircraft
would add striking power to the mix. The force won’t need to be as big as
the current buildup, but it would be significant, and the cost would be
considerable (perhaps $5 billion to $10 billion dollars annually). It would
also entail geopolitical costs as well, since it will limit the ability of the
U.S. to move its forces to other theaters. Allies would be necessary to
supply some capabilities like frigates, which the U.S. Navy lacks, for escort
and additional mine-sweeping to supplement America’s limited resources for
counter-mine warfare. Our European allies have long had the bulk of the
West’s mine-sweepers.
In short, this would be
a considerable military mission, more redolent of the “forever wars” that the
president and vice president have decried rather than the “right-sized”
presence envisaged by his administration in 2024.
With an American failure
in the strait, demands on American intelligence are going to increase since
Tehran will likely want to push the envelope and try to hurt us even
more—regardless of what is in Trump’s agreement with the clerical regime. War
or no war, all of the mundane intelligence tasks aren’t
disappearing. Washington will have to monitor the bombed nuclear
facilities closely, and the bombed underground military bases and factories
involved with ballistic-missile and drone production. We will need to know
how many and what kind of missiles and drones the Islamic Republic will be able
to build, and how quickly, given the damage to factories and supply lines, and
whether the Russians and Chinese will meaningfully help the effort. With a
U.S. defeat in the strait, it’s a very good bet that both Russia and China will
see greater strategic value in an axis that is already well-established.
Moscow, which benefits enormously from higher oil prices and is increasingly
under stress in the Ukraine war, may be tempted to rearm Iran with better
weapons.
All of this U.S.
intelligence effort will unavoidably keep us thinking about regime change in
the Islamic Republic; we would be foolish not to do so since, ultimately, the
collapse of the Islamist government is the only answer to all of the problems
that started with Ruhollah Khomeini’s triumph.
Iran’s internal problems
remain enormous. This war has made most of them worse. The unpleasantness
of an Iranian triumph in the Gulf—and the Islamist hubris that it will generate
in Tehran—may be enough to finally shake Democrats out of their engagement
fantasy. There may be enough liberal internationalist sentiment left among
Democrats to explore ways of helping the Iranian people and keep Democrats on
the congressional intelligence committees from killing clandestine
programs. We also assume that Republicans won’t go belly up, that
isolationism and the Iran-is-no-threat rumination that Tucker Carlson and his
ilk sometimes express, won’t gain more ground.
The Trump administration
and much of the right are allergic to the phrase “regime change,” seeing it as
a negation of the “realism” favored by many in the America First
crowd. But the ugliness of what may well happen globally after freedom of
navigation ends in the Persian Gulf may be enough, combined with the enforced
frugality that is surely coming because of the size of America’s national debt,
to encourage folks on the right and left to seek relatively inexpensive options
for countering an Islamic Republic doped up on victory.
And the ongoing
intelligence war between the United States and Iran will surely complement the
intelligence war between Israel and the Islamic Republic. Intelligence
cooperation, because it doesn’t usually happen openly, has a certain resilience
that defies the passions of the day.
Intelligence—operational—success
is inevitably tied to how much risk clandestine services and their political
overlords want to endure. The Islamic Republic is an existential threat to the
Jewish state; to the United States, the clerical regime has been a
non-existential but deadly foe. These differences in perspective and fear
are sufficient to explain why the Israelis have had the patience and fortitude
to work the Iranian target in ways that have been impossible for American or
European intelligence services. But that disparity, besides producing a certain
jealousy and sometimes anger inside CIA headquarters at Langley, offers
advantages to Washington if it decides to get more serious about aid to the
Iranian people.
Jerusalem may well try
to do things that Washington may object to: first and foremost, the delivery of
large quantities of weaponry to resistance groups inside Iran. The Israelis
wanted to do a delivery to the Kurds, who apparently were willing to take the
fight to the dominant ethnic group, the Persians, on whom the regime
depends. Trump, possibly motivated by a call from Turkish President Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan, limited the operation. As a rule, Washington wants to
imagine that Iran can come out whole, ideally democratic, after the collapse of
the Islamic Republic; the Israelis, as a rule, are far more pessimistic about
the evolutionary political possibilities of Muslims. Ethnic warfare inside Iran
may appeal to them since accessing minority groups on Iran’s borders is
operationally much easier; it would be payback for all of the proxies that
Tehran has unleashed on the Jewish state.
Moving arms into the
hands of Iranians who really matter—and who would know how to use them—would be
a long-term project for Jerusalem, or Washington, since there are now, so far
as we know, no organized Azeri or Persian opposition groups that could even use
this weaponry against the Revolutionary Guards and the street-level security
service, the Basij. Delivering weapons to
other Iranian ethnic groups that do already have organized, armed outfits—the
Kurds and the Baluch—can’t possibly topple the clerical regime. Only the Azeris
and Persians, if they rebelled in large numbers, can overcome the status
quo. Until such organized outfits exist, any effort to deliver weaponry to
where it matters most would just end in delivering arms to the Revolutionary
Guards and the Iranian intelligence ministry. It would be quite the
trial-and-error process for any foreign power to develop something that the
natives haven’t so far figured out how to establish.
America and Israel can
weaken Iran, but the task of displacing it will surely be up to the Iranian
people. All revolutions, at core, are psychological phenomena. Before a
decisive mass of people take to and stay in the streets, they must perceive
weakness in the regime and a measure of immunity for themselves. Significant
defections and dissension within the ruling elite are the necessary precursors
to any successful insurrection. Thus far, the Islamic Republic has gone wobbly,
but it hasn’t lost its bearings. Still, little operational successes—baby steps
for both a foreign intelligence service and Iranian protesters who must prove
that they can organize and not get shattered—may open up larger opportunities
hitherto unseen.
None of the above should
offer any immediate hope to the United States, or to the Iranian people. We are
now stuck in a predicament where Washington may have already lost a war against
a Middle Eastern power that has defined itself in opposition to America. Lost
wars always have painful repercussions. But unless the United States is leaving
the Middle East with its tail between its legs, a bloody struggle with the
Islamic Republic will continue. Iran’s revolutionary elite knows that. Do we?
Eric
S. Edelman was undersecretary of defense for policy (2005-2009) and has served
as the co-chair for the congressionally mandated Commissions to review the
National Defense Strategy in 2018 and 2024.
