How
the Trump Campaign’s Mobile App Is Collecting Massive Amounts of Voter Data
By Sue Halpern
September 13, 2020
The data-collecting methods of the software company Phunware’s Trump 2020 app are reminiscent of those used by Cambridge Analytica.
Since the Trump campaign
set up a shell company called American Made Media Consultants,
in 2018, an entity it describes as a “vendor responsible for arranging and
executing media buys and related services at fair market value,” it’s been
nearly impossible to know whom the campaign is paying, for what, and how much.
But, on May 27th, Alan Knitowski, the C.E.O. of Phunware, an Austin-based ad
broker and software company, announced a
“strategic relationship with American Made Media Consultants on the development,
launch and ongoing management and evolution of the Trump-Pence 2020 Reelection
Campaign’s mobile application portfolio.” Although Phunware never showed up in
the campaign’s F.E.C. reports, Phunware’s S.E.C.
filings show that, since last year, it has been paid around four million
dollars by A.M.M.C.
On
its face, Phunware seems like a strange choice to develop the campaign’s app.
Before working for President Trump, Phunware’s software was being used in
relatively few applications, the most popular being a horoscope app. And, since
2019, it has been embroiled in a lawsuit with Uber, a
former client of the company’s ad-placement business. The dispute stems from a
yearlong investigation by two former Phunware employees who discovered that the
company was pretending to place Uber ads on Web sites like CNN when, in fact,
they were appearing on pornography sites, among others, if they appeared at
all. But, according to former Phunware employees and business associates, the
company’s value to the Trump campaign is not in software development. “The
Trump campaign is not paying Phunware four million dollars for an app,” a
former business partner of the company told me. “They are paying for data. They
are paying for targeted advertising services. Imagine if every time I open my
phone I see a campaign message that Joe Biden’s America means we’re going to
have war in the streets. That’s the service the Trump campaign and Brad
Parscale”—the Trump campaign’s senior adviser for data and digital
operations—“have bought from Phunware. An app is just part of the package.”
The
Trump 2020 app is a massive data-collection tool in its own right. When
it launched, on April
23rd, Parscale, who was then Trump’s campaign manager, urged his
followers on Facebook to “download
the groundbreaking Official Trump 2020 App—unlike other lame political apps
you’ve seen.” Despite the hype, the 2020 app recapitulates many of the
functions found on the 2016 app. There’s a news feed
with Trump’s social-media posts, an events calendar, and recorded videos. The
“gaming” features that distinguished the 2016 app are still prominent—a
“Trump’s army” member who accumulates a hundred thousand points by sharing
contacts or raising money is promised a photograph with the President, while
other members can use points to get discounts on maga gear. Users are prompted to invite friends to
download the app—more points!—and can use the app to sign up to make calls on
behalf of the campaign, to be a poll watcher, to register voters, and to get
tickets to virtual and in-person events.
The
most obvious new feature on the 2020 app is a live news broadcast, carefully
curated by the campaign to push the President’s talking points. It is hosted by
a cast of campaign surrogates, including Lara Trump, Eric Trump’s wife,
and Kimberly Guilfoyle, Donald Trump, Jr.,’s
girlfriend and the campaign’s national finance chair. There are also channels
aimed at particular demographic groups, among them Women for Trump, Black
Voices for Trump, and Latinos for Trump. Though it is a crude approximation of
a traditional news outlet, the Trump app enables users to stay fully
sequestered within the fact-optional Trump universe. “I think everything we do
is to counter the media,” Parscale told Reuters in
June. “This is another tool in the tool shed to fight that fight, and it’s a
big tool.” In May, after Twitter labelled one of Trump’s tweets as being in violation of its
standards, sparking renewed claims of liberal-media censorship of conservatives
(despite the fact that the tweet was not taken down), downloads of the campaign
app soared.
To
access the Trump app, users must share their cell-phone numbers with the
campaign. “The most important, golden thing in politics is a cellphone
number,” Parscale told Reuters.
“When we receive cellphone numbers, it really allows us to identify them across
the databases. Who are they, voting history, everything.” Michael Marinaccio, the
chief operating officer of Data Trust, a private Republican data company, said
recently that “what’s new this year, or at least a sense of urgency, is getting
as many cell-phone numbers as we can in the voter file data.” An effective way
to do that is to entice supporters to share not only their own cell-phone
numbers with the campaign but those of their contacts as well. One estimate,
by Eliran Sapir, the C.E.O.
of Apptopia, a mobile-analytics company, is that 1.4 million app downloads
could provide upward of a hundred million phone numbers. This will enable the
Trump campaign to find and target people who have not consented to handing over
their personal information. It’s not unlike how Cambridge Analytica was able to harvest the
data of nearly ninety million unsuspecting Facebook users, only this time it is
one’s friends, family, and acquaintances who are willfully handing over the
data for a chance to get a twenty-five-dollar discount on a maga hat.
By
contrast, the new Biden app still collects data on users, but it outlines the
specific uses of that data and doesn’t automatically collect the e-mail and
phone numbers of users’ friends and family. “Unlike the Biden app, which seeks
to provide users with awareness and control of the specific uses of their data,
the Trump app collects as much as it can using an opt-out system and makes no
promises as to the specific uses of that data,” Samuel Woolley, the director of the propaganda
research project at the University of Texas’s Center for Media Engagement, told
me. “They just try to get people to turn over as much as possible.”
ATrump
spokesperson told me, “The Trump 2020 app was built by Phunware as a one-stop destination
with a variety of tools to get voters engaged with President Trump’s reëlection
campaign.” Among its main contributions to the app’s data-mining capabilities
is a “location experience kit,”
which the company had previously marketed to hospitals and malls to help people
navigate unfamiliar buildings. Visitors could pair their phone’s Bluetooth with
beacons set up throughout the facility. Initially, the Trump 2020 app was built
around big rallies, where this
feature would have been useful. According to one former employee, however, the
company’s location software, which functions even when the app is not open, may be
capable of sucking up more than geographic coördinates. It could potentially
“sniff out all of the information you have on your phone. Any sort of
registration data, your name, your phone number, potentially your Social
Security number, and other pieces of data. It could sniff out how many apps you
have on your phone, what type of apps you have on your phone, what apps you
deleted recently, how much time you’ve spent in an app, and your dwell time at
various specific locations. It could give a very intimate picture of that
individual and their relationship with that mobile device.” (Phunware did not respond
to multiple requests for comment.)
In 2017, as Phunware was
moving into the election space, the
company’s Web site announced, “As soon as the first few campaigns recognize the
value of mobile ad targeting for voter engagement, the floodgates will open.
Which campaign will get there first and strike it rich?” A year later,
according to people familiar with the effort, the company used its
location-tracking capabilities to create a lobbying campaign on behalf of a
health-care company aiming to influence legislators in Georgia. It put a
“geofence” around the governor’s mansion that recorded the I.D. of every device
that went in and out of the building, and then used the I.D.s to send targeted
messages to those phones (likely including the governor’s) about the
legislation it was aiming to influence. The legislation passed. Phunware’s
leadership has also discussed their ability to geofence polling places, according
to people who were present during these discussions, in order to send targeted
campaign ads to voters as they step into the voting booth. While it is illegal
to advertise in the vicinity of the polls, using location data in this way to
send targeted ads could enable a campaign to breach that border
surreptitiously.
Phunware’s
data collection on behalf of the Trump campaign likely extends beyond the app
as well. According to Phunware’s chief operating officer, Randall Crowder, the
company has created a “data exchange” that “enables digital marketers to design
custom audiences within minutes using geographic, interest, intent, and
demographic segments . . . high-quality G.P.S. location data
points from one hundred million-plus devices in the United States to increase
scale of location-based audiences.” In its promotional materials, the company also claims
to have unique device I.D.s for more than a billion mobile devices worldwide,
and to have developed what it calls a Knowledge Graph—a “consumer-centric
collection of actions, preferences, characteristics and predicted behavior” from
the data it has siphoned from mobile phones and tablets. Much like Facebook’s
social graph, which has been described as “the global mapping of
everybody and how they’re related,” this enables the company to quickly sort
through large data sets, uncovering connections and relations that otherwise
would be obscured. For example: middle-aged women who live alone, rarely vote,
own guns, and live in a border state.
So
how did Phunware obtain a billion unique device I.D.s? As the company described
it to the S.E.C., they were collected from phones and tablets that use
Phunware’s software. But, according to people who have worked with the company,
in addition to the data it obtains through its software, Phunware has been
using its ad-placement business as a wholesale data-mining operation. When it
bids to place an ad in an app like, for example, Pandora, it scoops up the I.D.
of every phone and tablet that would have been exposed to the ad, even if it
loses the bid. By collecting and storing this information, the company is able
to compile a fairly comprehensive picture of every app downloaded on those
devices, and any registration data a user has shared in order to use the app.
This
information can yield rich demographic data. If a campaign is looking for young
men with an affinity for guns, for instance, it might look at who has
downloaded both Call of Duty and CCW, the Concealed Carry Fifty State app.
Then, using the location data associated with the device I.D., the data can be
unmasked and linked to an individual. Once a campaign knows who someone is, and
where a person lives, it is not difficult to start building a voter file, and
using this information to tailor ads and messages.
Tom
Wheeler, the former chair of the Federal Communications Commission, told me,
“These are Cambridge Analytica-like techniques. It’s collecting the descriptive
power of data from multiple sources, most of which the consumer doesn’t even
know are being collected. And that’s what Cambridge Analytica did.”
In
late July, a group of lawmakers, led by Senator Bill Cassidy, Republican of
Louisiana, and his Democratic colleague Ron Wyden, of Oregon, sent a letter to the chair
of the Federal Trade Commission asking him to investigate whether using bidding
information in this way constitutes an unfair and deceptive practice. “Few
Americans realize that companies are siphoning off and sharing that ‘bidstream’
data to compile exhaustive dossiers about them,” they wrote, “which are then
sold to hedge funds, political campaigns, and even to the government without court
orders.” According to Charles Manning, the C.E.O. of Kochava, a data
marketplace, “There are no regulatory bodies that appear to be aware of the
technological foundations upon which digital advertising operates. This is a
challenge, because without understanding how programmatic ads are bought and
sold, regulators face an uphill battle in applying regulation that deals with
opaque supply chains where fraudulent behavior can flourish.”
The
Trump app, at least, is explicit about what it expects from its users: “You may
be asked to provide certain information, including your name, username,
password, e-mail, date of birth, gender, address, employment information, and
other descriptive information,” the app’s privacy policy states. “The Services
[of the app] may include features that rely on the use of information stored
on, or made available through, your mobile Device. . . .
We . . . reserve the right to store any information about the
people you contact via the Services. . . . We reserve the right
to use, share, exchange and/or disclose to DJTFP affiliated committee and third
parties any of your information for any lawful purpose.” (When I asked Woolley
why the campaign was asking supporters to share their contacts, since it
already had access to them through the app’s permissions, he pointed out that,
when a user shares their contacts to earn points, “that actually sends out
messages to your contacts asking them to download the app. So rather than just
getting data on your friends and family, they are able to also reach out to
them using you as a reference.”)
The
policy also notes that the campaign will be collecting information gleaned from
G.P.S. and other location services, and that users will be tracked as they move
around the Internet. Users also agree to give the campaign access to the
phone’s Bluetooth connection, calendar, storage, and microphone, as well as
permission to read the contents of their memory card, modify or delete the
contents of the card, view the phone status and identity, view its Wi-Fi
connections, and prevent the phone from going to sleep. These permissions give
the Trump data operation access to the intimate details of users’ lives, the
ability to listen in on those lives, and to follow users everywhere they go.
It’s a colossal—and essentially free—data-mining enterprise. As Woolley and his
colleague Jacob Gursky wrote in MIT
Technology Review, the Trump 2020 app is “a voter surveillance tool of
extraordinary power.”
I
learned this firsthand after downloading the Trump 2020 app on a burner phone I
bought in order to examine it, using an alias and a new e-mail address. Two
days later, the President sent me a note, thanking me for joining his team.
Lara Trump invited me (for a small donation) to become a Presidential adviser.
Eric Trump called me one of his father’s “FIERCEST supporters from the
beginning.” But the messages I began getting from the Trump campaign every
couple of hours were sent not only to the name and address I’d used to access
the app. They were also sent to the e-mail address and name associated with the
credit card I’d used to buy the phone and its sim card, neither of which I had shared with the
campaign. Despite my best efforts, they knew who I was and where to reach me.
